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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter as it
is an appeal from the Third District Court of the State of Utah
according to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2(g (1987).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order entered by Judge David Young
of the Third District Court in December, 1989 in which the property
of the parties was divided equitably, according to the terms of a
constructive trust which was created between the parties.

3

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Were the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree
of the District Court fair, equitable, and based upon the evidence
presented such that the determination that the parties1 assets
should be divided pursuant to the terms of a constructive trust
is not an abuse of discretion?
2.

Was the law relating to constructive trusts correctly

applied in this matter such that the judgment of the Trial Court
should stand?
3. Is this appeal frivolous, given the prior decision of the
Court of Appeals, which adopted no arguments presented by the
appellant which would eliminate any award to the respondent, but
merely indicated that a different legal theory should be used to
characterize the division of those assets?
4. Should the respondent be awarded her reasonable attorney's
fees and costs incurred in this matter, due to the repetitive
nature of the appellant's arguments, and the frivolousness of this
appeal?
ISSUES AS PRESENTED BY THE APPELLANT
5. Is the relationship between appellant and respondent best
described as a constructive trust?
6. Should not the relationship be best described as a joint
venture falling under the partnership rules?
7. Can a constructive trust be claimed with limited evidence
in support?
4

8.Can a constructive trust be dissolved, rather than created
and enforced by law.
9.1s

a

constructive

trust

created

to

prohibit

unjust

enrichment?
10. Can plaintiff's admitted statement be ignored?
11. Is not the written statement an accord and satisfaction
t all claims respondent may bring forth later.
12. Is not plaintiff barred by statutory time limit to attack
validity of argument?
13.

Now

that

plaintiff's

common-law

marriage

has

been

rejected, is it necessary to include third parties in this action?
14. Should the plaintiff be compelled to amend her complaint
to state a cause of action so the defendant may make an affirmative
defense?
15. Can the respondent place all liabilities on appellant's
property?
16. Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's motion
for distribution of funds after notice of appeal was filed?
17. What are the best interests of the parties' handicapped
child which is not over 18?
18. Should the respondent be unjustly enriched by confusing
the source and failing to keep records?
19.

Should plaintiff be rewarded

after

statements of limited assets to receive grants?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
None
5

filing

federal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case.

This is an appeal from an order entered

by Judge David Young of the Third District Court in December, 1989,
which terminated the relationship of the parties and equitably
divided

their joint assets pursuant to the legal theory of

constructive trust.
Course of the proceedings. This appeal is from a final order
of Judge David Young of the Third District Court.

The Plaintiff

filed a complaint for divorce on October 14, 1983.

The trial in

this matter was held on June 9, 1987.

The Plaintiff and Defendant

presented witnesses and testimony of both of them was taken, and
closing arguments were heard. The Trial Court determined that the
parties relationship was a common-law marriage, and he equiitably
divided the parties1 assets.
The defendant appealed, and received a decision

dated July

5, 1989, which indicated that the parties1 relationship was not a
common-law marriage. The decision did suggest several other legal
theories which might apply.
The

plaintiff

then

filed

proposed

findings

of

fact,

conclusions of law, and order dividing the parties1 assets pursuant
to a constructive trust, which was approved by the court in
December, 1989.
The defendant then filed this appeal.
Disposition in the trial court.

The Trial Court found that

the parties relationship was a constructive trust, based upon the
6

confidential

nature

of

parties1

the

relationship,

and

the

substantial unjust enrichment which would occur if the defendant
were allowed to retain all of the parties1 assets.
Statement of material facts.

Plaintiff,

Helen

Layton,

hereinafter known as "Helen" and the Defendant, Donald Layton,
hereinafter known as "Don" met in 1946 when Helen was fifteen
(T57,L17) years old. After about two years, Helen began to work
with Don cutting down trees, before and after her other job
(T58,L7).

In 1952, at age 20 she became pregnant, and went to

California (T59,L2) for a time, but returned to Utah and lived with
Don's parents until the baby (the parties1 son Robert), was born
on November 6, 1952 (T59,L11).
until 1954.
living.

Helen then lived with her parents

During this time, Helen and Don felled trees for a

With the money they earned, she and Don bought a fire

damaged house located at Banks Court in Salt Lake City (T59,L14),
and worked together to make it habitable, and in 1954 Helen and
young Robert moved in (T60,L19). Don moved in a short time later.
Don and Helen intended to get married, and even purchased a
marriage license, but they "never got around" to getting married
(T61,L22).
The parties continued to work together, felling trees and
demolishing houses for income. They began purchasing real property
at tax sales, and bought a number of parcels, and one five acre
parcel which was located at 33 00 South and Wasatch Boulevard was
purchased for the sum of $6,666.66 which was paid in $1,000 per
year installments (T62,L25).

In approximately 1961 that property
7

was sold for the sum of $40,000.00 and the parties used those funds
to purchase further properties.
Helen always participated in the choice of property and the
negotiations for price and terms of each purchase. Over the years,
some parcels have been sold or condemned by various government
agencies, and the proceeds from those sales have always been used
to pay expenses for the family, the properties, or to purchase
further parcels.
From 1954 until 1980 the parties supported themselves from
the earnings of the properties, the sale of raspberries and other
fruit tended and picked by them, from tree felling, and demolition
work.

Neither party had regular full time employment for a third

person. Helen worked alongside Don on a full time basis, even when
pregnant with their three subsequent children (T63,L10). The only
time she did not work an equal amount with Don was when Angie (born
in 1962) and Michael (born in 1964) were very small, but as soon
as they were in school she resumed roofing, painting, and otherwise
managing the parties' properties.

She also did all of the

bookkeeping for the family, which was a considerable amount of
work, during those years.
Helen and Don held themselves out to all who knew them as a
married couple (T27,L18) (T20,L3) (T12,L25) (T37,L25), and the real
property purchased by them reflects both of their names.

The

parcels which do not reflect joint ownership which Helen claims
should be awarded to her are titled in Don's name alone due to an
oversight. The parties had no funds which were not joint, and all
8

property purchased during that time should be (and most were)
placed in joint names.
The parties had a joint bank account (T64,L2), in the name
of Don or Helen Layton and they filed joint income tax returns each
year (T63,L24).

All income from their various pursuits was used

to support themselves, their children, and the properties, and
there is no indication that there was any division of any of the
real or personal property of the parties along the lines of "yours"
or "mine" during the history of the parties prior to their
difficulties and final separation.
In early 1971 Danny was born afflicted with Down's Syndrome,
and the parties troubles began.

Helen was asked to leave the

parties' residence in 1976 (T67,L1), and was gone for three months,
but moved back to the family residence at Banks Court in October
of that year.

In early 1977 Helen again moved out (T67,L6), this

time for four months, and then again moved back to Banks Court (the
family residence).

During this separation Helen had no outside

job, and continued to do what she could to further the family
business.
In November of 1979 Helen went to California (T70,L5) and did
obtain employment there.

She returned in April of 1980 to file a

joint income tax return with Don, as the parties had done since
approximately 1954.

In May of that year, Don purchased the house

at Villa Drive, "for Helen." (T50,L8) She returned to Utah in May
and moved into the house. Helen obtained employment with Gem State
Mutual Insurance Company in the Fall of 1980, and her earnings went
9

to pay the household expenses on the Villa Drive house (T71,L25),
along with whatever else was needed.

During this time she still

worked to care for the properties on weekends and evenings (took
her vacation to pick raspberries) and the parties still lived
together and held themselves out to be husband and wife.

Don

lived at Banks Court for a few months after May of 1980, but
eventually he moved to the Villa Drive house and the parties lived
together until 1983 (T72,L7). Helen left the Villa Drive house in
1983 and filed this action.
Don has had the full management and control of all of the
parties1 properties, both real and personal, since the filing of
this action.

He has had the personal use and enjoyment of all of

the income from the property, and he has had the burden of caring
for the property, but he has not paid all of the property taxes
and assessments which are outstanding against the real property of
the parties.

The income from the properties is approximately

$32,000 per year, and the property taxes are approximately §12,000
per year, leaving a difference of $22,000 per year for living
expenses and any other expenses required for the property.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The findings and decree of the Trial Court are supported

by the evidence and are not an abuse of discretion. The Plaintiff
presented evidence that she and the Defendant had a continuous, if
sometimes stormy, relationship from 1954 until 1983. Witnesses and
documents

presented

into

evidence

proved

that

the parties'

relationship was of the type contemplated by the cases regarding
10

constructive trust, as the defendant was holding assets which in
equity and good conscience should be possessed by the plaintiff,
due to their long relationship and the absence of separate funds
between them.
A great injustice would occur if the defendant were allowed
to retain all of the parties1 assets, almost all of which are held
in joint name, which represented the fruit of both parties1
lifetime of work and effort.
The Defendant at trial, or since the decision of the Court of
Appeals, has refused to provide any evidence or argument as to the
fairness or lack thereof of the proposed property settlement, other
than to allege that the Plaintiff should receive nothing.

The

Plaintiff produced an extensive exhibit of the properties, showing
their locations, tax valuations, purchase prices, and including
photographs, if relevant. The Plaintiff stated under oath that she
would agree that the Defendant could receive either side of the
list dividing the property prepared by her. The Defendant has never
presented any evidence that the division according to that list was
unfair. Accordingly, the division was equitable, and the Court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the relationship between
the parties consisted of a constructive trust, which should now be
dissolved.

There is no need for further evidentiary hearing or

amendment of pleadings, as the evidence at trial was complete, and
adequately

addressed

the

issues presented

by

the

theory

of

constructive trust as well as the legal theories actually presented
at trial.

In any event, the defendant did not object to the
11

Court's determination that a constructive trust existed between the
parties, and accordingly should not be allowed to do so now.
2.

The law relating to constructive trusts was correctly

applied in this matter such that the judgment of the Trial Court
should

stand.

The theory

of constructive

trust requires a

confidential relationship between the parties, and an inequity
which would result if one of the parties were allowed to retain
assets as a result of the confidential relationship, to the
detriment of the other party.

Such a relationship existed here,

and accordingly, the law was correctly applied.
3.

This

appeal is frivolous, given the prior decision of

the Court of Appeals, which adopted none of the arguments presented
by the appellant other than to indicate that an incorrect legal
theory had been applied.

The appellant failed to object to the

legal theory adopted by the Trial Court, and cannot now find fault
with it.

In his own brief filed herein, he does not present any

new arguments resulting from the choice of legal theory, and he
merely rehashes the same arguments he made in his prior appeal.
4.

The

respondent

should

be

awarded

her

reasonable

attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter, due to the
repetitive

nature

of

the

frivolousness of this appeal.

appellant's

arguments,

and

the

The appellant failed to file a

supersedeas bond in this matter, yet the mere existence of this
appeal has prevented the respondent from selling any of the
property awarded to her to raise badly needed cash.

To compound

that injury, she has been forced to expend her meager funds to pay
12

attorney's fees to respond to yet another appeal in this matter.

ARGUMENT
1.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF
THE DISTRICT COURT ARE FAIR, EQUITABLE, AND BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT TRIAL SUCH THAT THIS JUDGMENT IS NOT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
Don and Helen have lived together for 19 years, raised four
children, and amassed a sizeable estate of real and personal
property.

They held themselves out to be married, and lived as

though they were.

The property of the parties represents their

life's work, and neither of them had any other.

With rare

exception, the assets held by them were in their joint names.
This conduct has created a constructive trust between them, due to
their confidential relationship.

Don offered to be a husband and

father, and Helen accepted by being a wife and mother and both
expected to share equally in the profits of their life's work. At
no time did Helen intend to transfer all of her assets to Don for
his benefit alone.

Now the constructive trust can no longer

continue due to the parties1 inability to work together and Donfs
attempted appropriation of all of them. The assets acquired by the
parties have been divided using the equitable principles created
by

a constructive

trust, and

Don should

not be allowed to

appropriate all of the parties1 assets for himself for the sole
reason that the parties were not legally married.
In Ashton vs. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), The Utah
Supreme Court

found that a confidential

13

relationship

existed

between the parties when one party conveyed his interest in real
property to his brother, with the oral agreement that grantee would
reconvey
resolved.

the

property

when

grantor's

marital

problems

were

When grantee refused to reconvey the property, the

lawsuit ensued.

The Court created a constructive trust, and

ordered reconveyance of the property.
In this matter, Helen has placed almost all of her assets in
joint name with Don, based upon their confidential relationship,
without which she would not have done so.

Don has produced no

evidence that he had any separate funds during the time the
property was acquired, and Helen has not asked for any assets
acquired by Don after this matter was filed. Now Don seeks to have
all of the assets for himself, and the Trial Court has refused to
allow him to retain those assets, and has equitably divided them
between the parties.
Without the Court's aid, Helen would receive nothing from a
lifetime of work, and Don would receive all of this property, even
though it was not acquired by his efforts alone. At no time during
the course of this action has Helen claimed that Don is not
entitled to an equitable division of approximately one-half of the
parties' assets.
The Court should ratify the parties' 19 year constructive
trust, and should let stand the decision of the Trial Court.
2.

THE LAW RELATING TO CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS WAS CORRECTLY

APPLIED IN THIS MATTER SUCH THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD STAND.
14

The

legal

theory

of

constructive

trust

requires

the

following:
1. A confidential relationship between the parties, and,
2. Unjust enrichment which would result if one of the parties
were allowed to retain assets as a result of the confidential
relationship, to the detriment of the other party, Matter of Estate
of Hock. 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982).
In Mattes vs. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988), the
Utah Court of Appeals overturned a trial court finding of commonlaw marriage and a constructive trust. That case differs from this
matter in several respects.
First, the parties in Mattes lived together for only two
years.

In this matter they lived together for 19 years.

Second, the parties in Mattes had their own separate sources
of income, where in this matter for 19 years the parties only
sources of income were their own joint labor in their joint
enterprises.
Third, in Mattes, the "wife" was seeking to overturn her
execution of a valid deed granting title to the "husband" in his
name alone. In this matter, Helen is seeking an equitable division
of a great deal of real and personal property, almost all of which
is already held in joint name, and all of which was obtained by
joint funds, so that the validity of her claim is much more clear
than in Mattes.
Fourth, Judge Orme in his concurring opinion in Mattes,
indicates that the "wife" could have retained the property on the
15

theory of a resulting trust rather than a constructive trust.

He

states that a resulting trust arises from the failure of an express
trust, with full performance of an express trust, and payment of
the purchase price for property by one, but put in the name of
another.

This theory could also apply to this matter, if the

Appeals Court should so determine.
The Utah Supreme Court has required that the doctrine of
confidential
parties.

relationship

requires an

inequality

between the

In this matter, the parties lived as equal partners for

most of their 19 years together, but there was evidence presented
at trial which indicates that, toward the end, Don did exercise
domination over Helen, and that he at one time shot at her with a
gun. However, it is his refusal to give her any of the income from
the properties, or allow her to sell or otherwise share in them
after the separation of the parties, which creates his position of
superiority which, by the time he began to exercise it, made it
impossible for Helen to get out of this relationship with any of
her assets.
There has been no evidence presented that Don did more work
or provided more funds than Helen.

There are no citations to the

record by Don to indicate that such evidence was presented at
trial, or that the Trial Court refused to accept that evidence.
Don has provided no compelling argument to indicate any argument
which would justify awarding him all of the parties1 assets.
A clearly gross inequity would result if Don was allowed to
retain all of the parties1 assets merely because they were not
16

legally married• Helen would never had pooled her labor and assets
with Don if she had believed that Don would ultimately be the sole
owner of all of those assets, while she received nothing.

It was

this reliance, and Don's appropriation of those assets for himself,
which created the confidential relationship between them.

Their

joint efforts obtained those assets, and if they can no longer work
together, those assets should be equitably divided between them so
they can go their separate ways. The Trial Court did exactly that,
and the assets have been equitably divided between the parties.
3. THIS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS, GIVEN THE PRIOR DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS.
In the prior decision in this matter, the Court of Appeals
adopted none of the arguments presented by the appellant other than
to indicate that an incorrect legal theory had been applied.

The

appellant failed to object to the legal theory adopted by the Trial
Court, and cannot now find fault with it.

In his own brief filed

herein, he does not present any new arguments resulting from the
choice of legal theory, and he merely rehashes the same arguments
he made in his prior appeal.
4 . THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER REASONABLE ATTORNEYf S
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN THIS MATTER.
The

respondent should be awarded her reasonable attorney's

fees and costs incurred in this matter, due to the repetitive
nature of the appellant's arguments, and the frivolousness of this
appeal.

The appellant failed to file a supersedeas bond in this

matter, yet the mere existence of this appeal has prevented the
17

respondent from selling any of the property awarded to her to raise
badly needed cash.

To compound that injury, she has been forced

to expend her meager funds to pay attorneyfs fees to respond to yet
another appeal in this matter. Appellant has expended no funds for
his attorney, as he is representing himself, and his part of the
assets are not in dispute, so he is free to transfer them as he
sees fit. During the pendency of this appeal, the appellant has
paid

none of the

funds ordered by

the Trial

respondent, including the child support ordered.

Court to the
In light of all

of these factors, the respondent should be awarded her reasonable
attorneys fees and costs as set forth in the affidavit attached
hereto.
5. RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S ISSUES PRESENTED IN HIS BRIEF,
WHICH RESPONDENT FEELS ARE EITHER NOT RELEVANT, OR WERE ALREADY
PRESENTED IN THE PRIOR APPEAL AND FOUND TO BE WITHOUT MERIT:
5. Is the relationship between appellant and respondent best
described as a constructive trust?
This issue has been addressed above.
6. Should not the relationship be best described as a joint
venture falling under the partnership rules?
Don does not present any argument regarding this issue, but
it would appear that if this were a partnership, that the result
would be the same, with the most relevant feature being that Don
would not retain all of the parties' assets, and those assets would
be

divided

between

the parties

dissolution.
18

as part

of

the partnership

7. Can a constructive trust be claimed with limited evidence
in support?
No, but in this matter, there is ample evidence in the record
to support the finding that the parties' relationship was governed
by a constructive trust, and that the assets of the parties were
correctly and equitably divided.
8. Can a constructive trust be dissolved, rather than created
and enforced by law.
Yes.

The constructive trust is created by the relationship

of the parties, and if the relationship deteriorates such that one
party is attempting to appropriate all of the assets for himself,
then the Court can find that the trust exists, and then dissolve
it, equitably dividing the assets contained therein.
9.

Is

a

constructive

trust

created

to

prohibit

unjust

enrichment?
Yes.

Don is attempting to unjustly enrich himself at Helen's

expense, and the constructive trust is created to prevent that
unjust enrichment.
10. Can plaintiff's admitted statement be ignored?
See next issue.
11. Is not the written statement an accord and satisfaction
to all claims respondent may bring forth later.
Don has presented to the Court on numerous occasions, and did
present at the trial in this matter, a copy of a handwritten
statement which Helen admits she wrote, which states that "I hereby
relinquish all claim to all property in the name of Don and Helen
19

Layton."
Don claims that this is a binding contract, and that it
eliminates all claims Helen has to any of the parties1 real or
personal property.
This statement was found to be invalid by the Trial Court for
a number of reasons.

It is only written by Helen Layton, not

signed by her. It does not have a date. Most importantly, it does
not describe the property in question. It is not clear whether she
contemplated transferring the rights to a TV set, a car, or all of
these many parcels of real property.

At the time this statement

was made, Helen was an experienced buyer of real estate and had
executed many deeds and other contracts.

She knew that real and

personal property could not be transferred by such a statement, and
that to effect this statement she would have to sign quit-claim
deeds to all of the jointly held property.

Helen knew that to

transfer title to automobiles that her signature on the title would
be necessary.

Most of all, she knew that if she was coerced into

making the statement, that along with these other problems, the
statement would have no legal significance whatsoever.
This statement was written sometime in the 1970's, during
which time the parties continued to live together, and although
their personal relationship was deteriorating, their business
relationship did not materially change during this time.

At no

time did they behave as though this statement was a binding
agreement by executing quit-claim deeds, automobile titles, or
other bills of sale.
20

Because of these defects in the statement, and the actions of
the parties in failing to ratify or act as though the statement was
a valid contract, or an accord and satisfaction, and the statement
is exactly that and no more. It is not a contract, and it does not
transfer any property from one party to the other.
12. Is not plaintiff barred by statutory time limit to attack
validity of agreement?
No, because the agreement was not valid, and thus was not
governed by the statute of limitations.

Also, this argument was

not made at trial, and is now barred.
13.

Now

that

plaintifffs

common-law

marriage

has

been

rejected, is it necessary to include third parties in this action?
No.

The defendant has orally complained of the failure of

the court to include third parties to this action. However, Helen
included the only other person whose name was contained on the
titles of the property in question.

She knew of no other person

who was a partner, who had shared in
interest in these assets.
third parties.

profits, or who had an

Accordingly, she did not need to name

Don could have made a motion to include the third

parties anytime during the four years it took to get this matter
to trial, but he failed to do so, and it is far too late for him
to attempt to do so now.
14. Should the plaintiff be compelled to amend her complaint
to state a cause of action so the defendant may make an affirmative
defense?
No. The defenses to a claim of constructive trust are exactly
21

the same as the defenses which either were presented, or should
have been presented if Don were a better attorney•

Don has had an

ample opportunity to have his position heard, and there is no need
for an amended complaint or new trial in this matter when all of
the relevant evidence is already on the record herein.
15. Can the respondent place all liabilities on appellant's
property?
Yes.

The trial court required Don to pay the property taxes

and assessments which accrued during the time he along was managing
the property, because Don received all of the income from the
properties during the same time period, and this was correct.
16. Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's motion
for distribution of funds after notice of appeal was filed?
No.

Don failed to file a motion for stay or a supersedeas

bond in this matter, and accordingly, he cannot prevent the sale
of any property or asset pending appeal.
17. What are the best interests of the parties' handicapped
child which is not over 18?
Child custody was not an issue in the original trial, and now
that the child is over 18, his care is

a new issue, which should

be dealt with in an appropriate forum, which is not this appeal.
18. Should the respondent be unjustly enriched by confusing
the source and failing to keep records?
No.

However, Helen did keep good records.

The only party

who has failed to keep records is Don, who appeared at court with
a shoe box containing the records from the time of his sole
22

management of the property, and it is Don who refused to respond
to discovery sent by Helen.

All of the records Don attempted to

admit at trial were objected to by Helen on the grounds that Don
had

not

produced

those

records

pursuant

to

discovery,

and

accordingly could not produce them at trial. None of those records
indicated that any other person had an interest in the property,
or that Don had purchased any of the property with joint funds.
19.

Should plaintiff be rewarded

after filing

federal

statements of limited assets to receive grants?
At trial Don presented an application filled out by Helen for
college aid for the parties1 daughter. In that application, Helen
indicated

that

she

did

not

have

substantial

assets.

The

application was filled out while the matter was pending, and Don
was claiming to be the sole owner of those assets.

Helen, having

no guarantee she would ever receive any asset out of this matter,
did not feel she could claim ownership of those assets at that
time, since their ownership was in dispute.
The application was merely a statement of the facts at that
time, and was not found by the Trial Court to be relevant or
determinative of any of the issues between the parties.
ARGUMENTS ADDRESSED IN BODY OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF WHICH ARE
NOT SET FORTH ABOVE:
20. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to recognize agreement
made by respondent?
No.

See issue 11 above.

21. Is the Trial Court a co-conspirator to defraud the federal
23

government by awarding the respondent assets in this matter?
No. See issue 19 above.
22. Can plaintiff's admitted statement be ignored?
Yes. See issue 11 and issue 19 above.
CONCLUSION
The parties had a 19 year relationship, during which time they
raised four children and pooled all of their assets.

Don has

attempted to appropriate those assets for himself, and the Trial
Court has refused to allow him to do so. Instead, the Trial Court
has imposed a constructive trust upon the parties and their assets,
and has equitably divided them between the parties.
Don, by this appeal, has asked the Court of Appeals to
overturn the judgment of the Trial Court and award all of the
property to him.

He has not cited the record once in his brief.

He has cited no statute nor any relevant case law to support any
of his arguments. He has presented no argument at trial, (despite
the entreaties of the Trial Court to do so) and no compelling
argument here that the division of the property is inequitable, and
that some other division would be more fair. He just wants it all.
Don's position is inherently unfair, and in fact, shocking.
Helen would be deprived of her share of her life's work, and the
Trial Court correctly imposed this constructive trust to equitably
divide the parties' assets to prevent the unjust enrichment which
would result if Don were allowed to appropriate all of the property
for himself.

The division of the parties' assets by the Trial

Court should stand, and Helen should be awarded her attorney's fees
24

incurred in this appeal.
DATED this ]_0_ day of July, 1990.

Ma

ane Allen
ttorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
Helen Layton

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed
Respondent's Brief

a copy of the foregoing

to the Appellant, Don Layton, 220 Banks Court

Salt Lake City, Utah

83102

this Jj_ day of July, 1990.

% . . * -
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Jane Allen, Bar #45
Attorney for Plaintiff
8 East 300 South, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-1300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
HELEN LAYTON,
Plaintiff,

]|

FINDINGS OF FACT

]|

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

]

DONALD LAYTON,

])

Civil No. D83-3977

]I

Judge David Young

Defendant.

This matter was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals on July
9, 1989.

The Court remanded this matter to the trial court for

further findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with
the evidence presented at trial. The Appeals Court ruled that the
parties1 relationship was not covered by the statute regarding
common law marriage, but a number of other legal theories were
suggested. The Plaintiff proposed her findings, and the Defendant
responded.

After considering the arguments of both parties, the

court ordered that the theory of constructive trust be applied to
this matter, and based upon the record herein and good cause
appearing therefor, the Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties herein began living together in 1954, and lived
together almost continuously until 1983, when this action was
filed.

— •; vz)T

« A

»

2. The parties filed joint income taxes from 1954 until 1983.
3.

The parties pooled all of their income, which was

exclusively

from joint business endeavors, which were buying and

selling real property, felling trees, demolition of buildings, sale
of raspberries each summer.
4.

The parties owned no real property at the time their

relationship began, and all real and personal property owned by
them at the time of trial was purchased during the time they lived
together and was purchased with joint funds. The relationship of
the parties could be described as similar to a marriage, with the
relationship being confidential, and with each party dependent upon
the other for various services and emotional support during the
time the relationship existed.
5.

The equitable distribution as rendered by the Court is

supported by the principles of the parties' conduct, which created
a constructive trust.
6.

A constructive trust is arises to prevent manifest

injustice and can be applied to almost any circumstances, as set
forth in CJS, Sec.142 as follows:
Generally, any transaction may be the basis for creating a
constructive trust where for any reason the defendant holds funds
which in equity and good consience should be possessed by the
plaintiff, and the forms and varieties of constructive trusts are
practically without limit.
7.

In this matter, the parties lived as though they were

married, and had considerable joint assets.

A great injustice

would occur if the defendant were allowed to retain all of the

parties' assets, which represented the fruit of both parties1
lifetime of work and effort.
8.

Accordingly, a constructive trust may be imposed in this

matter, not necessarily because of the intention of the parties,
but because the person holding title to the property would be
unuustly enriched if he were permitted to keep the property. (See
Doing vs. Riley, CA Fla., 176 F. 2d 449; Potter vs. Lindsay,

60

N. W. 2d 133, 337 Mich. 404; Miller vs. Buecker. Comm. PI., 63 York
Leg. Rec. 53; Copenhaver vs. Duncan, Comm. PI., 60 York Leg. Rec.
105; McConnel vs. Dixon, 233 P. 2d 877, 68 Wyo. 301.)
9.

Utah has recognized the concept of constructive trusts,

and has no statues barring the application of this theory in this
matter.
10.

Their relationship and the divisions of the assets

accumulated

therein

are

governed

by

said

trust

whether

in

individual names or joint names.
11.

The Court further finds that matters related to property

distribution are unchanged hereby.

The Court followed equitable

principles in dividing the property and orders that those findings
and that distribution be set forth herein.
12.

From 1983 until June of 1987 the Defendant had complete

control of the parties1 assets and he received all income thereon,
and accordingly he should be responsible for all indebtedness,
property taxes, and assessments which were levied on the property
during that time that have not been paid by him.
13.

The parties raised

four children, one of whom is

handicapped and is in need of support beyond age 18. Danny, said

child, is presently residing with the Plaintiff, and she is in need
of support for his care and support in the sum of $200.00 per month
until such time as he no longer resides with her.
14.

The Plaintiff did make the writing which states that "I

hereby relinquish all claims to all property in the name of Don
Layton and Helen Layton."
15. The writing was made sometime in the 1970 f s, and an exact
date is impossible to determine, as the writing is not dated and
the parties1 testimony differs as to the approximate date.
16.

There is no evidence of consideration for the writing,

and the property mentioned therein is not identified with enough
particularity for the court to determine what property, if any, was
being transferred.
17.

The parties did

not later ratify

the writing by

transferring all of the jointly held real or personal property into
the name of the Defendant in reliance thereon, or otherwise
behaving as though the writing had validity.

Instead, they

continued their relationship as they had in the past.
18. The Court finds the note signed by the Plaintiff stating,
"I hereby relinquish all claim to all property in the name of Don
Layton and Helen Layton"

to be unsupported by consideration and

further to have been ignored by the parties until the Defendant
attempted to use it to his aadvantage in these proceedings. Thus,
this Court finds the note to be a nullity and ignores its content.
19. At the time of the filing of this action the parties1
property, both real and personal, was essentially intact, and had,
except

for

small

sales, not been transferred

to

others

or

encumbered by either of them.
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

parties

confidential

relationship

is

best

characterized as a constructive trust,
2. All property acquired by the parties, whether in joint or
separate name, has been equitably divided in an approximately equal
division according to value, as set forth below.
3. The parties to this action were the only beneficiaries of
the constructive trust, and have been duly notified of this action,
and sufficient evidence was obtained at trial to indicate a need
to equitably divide the assets of the trust.
4.

The writing produced by the Defendant does not transfer

any trust property to him, and is invalid, as it is not supported
by consideration nor has it been later ratified by the parties.
5. Accordingly, the personal and real property of the parties
shall be equitably

divided between them as follows:

PERSONAL PROPERTY:
6. The parties, along with their personal effects, owned, at
the time of the parties' separation the following items all of
which are presently in the possession of the Defendant:
four motorcycles
three pianos
Yamaha Organ
600 ounces of silver
Train collection (est. value $10,000.00)
Mechanics tools
Carpenters tools
Tree cutting tools
Caterpillar tractor
Road grader

Dump truck
Three pickup trucks
Camper
1959 Corvette
Saab Automobile
Gun collection
Substantial miscellaneous personal property
7. The Plaintiff shall retain the personal property in her
possession, and the Defendant shall awarded the personal property
in his possession, with the party retaining
responsible for all indebtedness thereon.

an

item to be

However, there is a

substantial inequity in this division, and the Plaintiff shall be
awarded the parcels of real property numbered 23-873-1 and 23-874,
page number 64 and 59 of Exhibit A as her sole and separate
property, subject to no claim by the Defendant.
8. The Plaintiff shall be awarded all personal property and
fixtures which is inside or on the real property awarded to her.
REAL PROPERTY:
9. The real property of the parties is extensive, and it is
divided as set forth in exhibit A, which is attached hereto.
PAST DUE PROPERTY TAXES, SEWER ASSESSMENTS, AND WATER BILLS:
10. The Defendant shall be responsible for all property taxes,
sewer assessments, and water bills and any other unpaid expenses
for the property awarded to the Plaintiff until it was transferred
to the Plaintiff's name alone, which occurred in July of 1987, and
those debts should be paid by Helen being awarded a lien against
parcel no.17-4963, page 50 of Exhibit A.

The amount of said lien

remains to be determined, and if the parties cannot agree as to the
amount, either party may move the court for a determination of the

amount of said lien- Said lien shall be paid whenever the property
is sold, or the Plaintiff may foreclose upon her lien if she so
desires.
CHILD SUPPORT:
11. The Defendant shall pay child support to the Plaintiff
inlthe sum of $200-00 per month for so long as he resides with the
Plaintiff.
12. Both parties shall maintain health and accident insurance
for

Daniel

so

long as

it is available through his or her

employment, and they shall share equally any medical, dental,
orthodontic or optical expenses incurred by him which are not
covered by insurance.
13. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the custody of Daniel,
subject to

the Defendant's reasonable rights of visitation.

SIGN ALL PAPERS:
14. The Defendant shall sign a quit-claim deed for each parcel
awarded to the Plaintiff, and she shall do the same, within two
weeks of the decision of this Court. If the Defendant should fail
to do so, the Plaintiff may petition the Court and have the Court
execute the documents, and the Defendant shall be responsible for
her attorney's fees required in doing so.
ATTORNEY'S FEES:
15. Each party should be responsible for his or her own
attorney's fees and costs. Should the Defendant again appeal this
matter, he should be responsible for the Plaintiff's reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred on said appeal, should the
Plaintiff be successful.

RESTRAINING ORDER:
16.

The

Defendant

shall

be permanently

restrained

from

harassing, threatening, or bothering the Plaintiff or her tenants.
DATED this

day of

, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

David Young
District Court Judge
Approved by:
Donald W. Layton
Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Decree of Divorce to Donald W. Layton, 3801 Villa Drive,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109, and 220 Banks Court, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84102 postage prepaid this

f

day of Lkc^^^—

\I<A
i /

Ctfh^

/ 1989.

Jane Allen, Bar #45
Attorney for Plaintiff
8 East 300 South, Suite 735

Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) 355-1300

84111

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN LAYTON,
Plaintiff,

]|

ORDER OF DISSOLUTION OF

I

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

]|

Civil No. D83-3977

]1

Judge David Young

vs.
DONALD LAYTON,
Defendant.

This matter was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals on July
9, 1989.

The Court remanded this matter to the trial court for

further findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with
the evidence presented at trial. The Appeals Court ruled that the
parties1 relationship was not covered by the statute regarding
common law marriage, but a number of other legal theories were
suggested. The Plaintiff proposed her findings, and the Defendant
responded.

After considering the arguments of both parties the

Court has determined that the theory of constructive trust applies
to this matter, and based upon the record herein and good cause
appearing therefor, and having made and entered its findings of
fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and
decreed:
DECREE OF DISSOLUTION
1. The confidentail relationship of the parties is hereby

characterized as a constructive trust, and said constructive trust
created by the parties is hereby dissolved.
2. All property acquired by the parties, whether in joint or
separate name, has been equitably divided in an approximately equal
division according to value, as set forth herein.
3. The parties to this action were the only beneficiaries of
the "constructive trust," and have been duly notified of this
action, and sufficient evidence was obtained at trial to indicate
a need to equitably divide the assets of the trust.
4.

The writing produced by the Defendant does not transfer

any trust property to him, and is invalid, as it is not supported
by consideration nor has it been later ratified by the parties.
5. Accordingly, the personal and real property of the parties
shall be equitably

divided between them as follows:

PERSONAL PROPERTY:
6. The parties, along with their personal effects, owned, at
the time of the parties1 separation the following items all of
which are presently in the possession of the Defendant:
four motorcycles
three pianos
Yamaha Organ
600 ounces of silver
Train collection (est. value $10,000.00)
Mechanics tools
Carpenters tools
Tree cutting tools
Caterpillar tractor
Road grader
Dump truck
Three pickup trucks
Camper
1959 Corvette
Saab Automobile
Gun collection
Substantial miscellaneous personal property

7. The Plaintiff shall retain the personal property in her
possession, and the Defendant shall awarded the personal property
in his possession, with the party retaining
responsible for all indebtedness thereon.

an item to be

However, there is a

substantial inequity in this division, and the Plaintiff shall be
awarded the parcels of real property numbered 23-873-1 and 23-874,
page number 64 and 59 of Exhibit A as her sole and separate
property, subject to no claim by the Defendant.
8. The Plaintiff shall be awarded all personal property and
fixtures which is inside or on the real property awarded to her.
REAL PROPERTY:
9. The real property of the parties is extensive, and it is
divided as set forth in exhibit A, which is attached hereto.
PAST DUE PROPERTY TAXES, SEWER ASSESSMENTS, AND WATER BILLS:
10. The Defendant shall be responsible for all property taxes,
sewer assessments, and water bills and any other unpaid expenses
for the property awarded to the Plaintiff until it was transferred
to the Plaintiff's name alone, which occurred in July of 1987, and
those debts should be paid by Helen being awarded a lien against
parcel no.17-4963, page 50 of Exhibit A.

The amount of said lien

remains to be determined, and if the parties cannot agree as to the
amount, either party may move the court for a determination of the
amount of said lien. Said lien shall be paid whenever the property
is sold, or the Plaintiff may foreclose upon her lien if she so
desires.
CHILD SUPPORT:

11. The Defendant shall pay child support to the Plaintiff
inlthe sum of $200.00 per month for so long as he resides with the
Plaintiff.
12. Both parties shall maintain health and accident insurance
for Daniel

so

long

as

it is available through

his or her

employment, and they shall share equally any medical, dental,
orthodontic or optical expenses incurred by him which are not
covered by insurance.
13. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the custody of Daniel,
subject to

the Defendant's reasonable rights of visitation.

SIGN ALL PAPERS:
14. The Defendant shall sign a quit-claim deed for each parcel
awarded to the Plaintiff, and she shall do the same, within two
weeks of the decision of this Court. If the Defendant should fail
to do so, the Plaintiff may petition the Court and have the Court
execute the documents, and the Defendant shall be responsible for
her attorney's fees required in doing so.
ATTORNEY'S FEES:
15. Each party should be responsible for his or her own
attorney's fees and costs. Should the Defendant again appeal this
matter, he should be responsible for the Plaintiff's reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred on said appeal, should the
Plaintiff be successful.
*****

RESTRAINING ORDER:
16.

The

Defendant

shall be permanently

restrained

from

harassing, threatening, or bothering the Plaintiff or her tenants.
DATED this

day of

, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

David Young
District Court Judge
Approved by:
Donald W. Layton
Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

to

Donald W. Layton, 3801 Villa Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109,
and 22 0 Banks Court, Salt Lake City, Utah
this _f

day of December, 1989.

84102 postage prepaid

Jane Allen, Bar #45
8 E. 300 S., Suite 735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)355-1300

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

HELEN LAYTON,
Plaintiff and Respondent, )]
vs.

|

DONALD LAYTON,

i

Defendant and Appellant, ])
i

Court of Appeals No:
900019-CA
Previous Appeal No:
870378-CA
Oral Argument Priority 14(b)

RESPONDENTS AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Comes now Jane Allen, attorney for Respondent, after being
duly sworn on oath, who deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the attorney for Helen Layton, Respondent in this

matter.
2.

I have performed the following services in responding to

the Appellant's brief at my normal hourly rate of $75.00 per hour:
Research of case law:

3 hours
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Writing brief: 10 hours
Preparing for and making oral argument (in the future)
3 hours
Total: 16 hours at $75.00 per hour = $1200.00

^/S - 7-6

Copies:

Grand total i Ij^^lb
DATED this JQ_

da

Y

of

July, 1990.

Jane
fane Allen
.Attorney for Respondent
Subscribed and sworn to before me this * ? ' day of^July, 1990.
My

Wsga

J
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I

'

\\
a

Atf>

^expires:

&

Commission
Expires Jun» *, 1392

O

^<C
/'Notary Public ,
/,' .
f
_
/ Residing i n : / ^jz^^l c* *-•*<_„ L s-*^-^

i/

JUDITH TERRY
a £is« Broadway #735
Salt Lak» City,
,£.
UT 84101

>
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£ o?
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed

a copy of the foregoing

Affidavit to the Appellant, Don Layton, 220 Banks Court
Salt Lake City, Utah

83102

this Jl_ day of July, 1990.
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